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INTRODUCTION
Appellant Adiyan Haran ("Haran") established in his opening brief that the
City of Escalante ("City") Board of Adjustment improperly allowed, contrary to
the City Zoning Ordinance, the expansion of a nonconforming livestock operation
on the residential lot next to his residence. The substantial evidence before the
Board of Adjustment was that, in the April 1996 timeframe, the lot at issue was
used to store at most six animals. Sometime after year 2000, when the fences were
repaired and upgraded, the livestock operation expanded significantly, to the point
of creating odor, noise, dust and runoff issues for the neighboring property owners.
The Board's ruling allowing eighteen animals plus their offspring to be stored on
this residential lot was contrary to the substantial evidence and must be reserved.
The City's brief attempts to justify the Board's decision by trying to find
ways to argue around the substantial evidence and, in the alternative, to read the
restriction against commercial cattle operations out of the Zoning Ordinance. Mr.
Haran seeks this Court's assistance in overturning the Board's decision and
limiting the use of the adjoining residential lot to no more than six animals. The
key evidence came directly from the owner of the animals at issue who claimed to
have kept a few animals, up to six or half a dozen, up to the April 1996 timeframe.
The Board arbitrarily ignored this evidence, which evidence was supported by the
other relevant record testimony. The limitation of the use to no more than six

4812-5931-9046 1

|

animals is required under the nonconforming use provision of the Zoning
Ordinance, which strictly prohibits expansion of nonconforming uses.
REPLV ARGUMENT
L

REPLY TO CITY'S FACTUAL STATEMENT
Haran makes the following points in reply to certain factual statements in the

City's brief.
Reply to Fact Paragraphs 9-10. Mr. Alvey's testimony covered historical
use of the property up to the year 1990, and thus lacked specific relevance to the
use of the property in April of 1996, the key timeframe for grandfathering
nonconforming uses under the City of Escalante Zoning Ordinance. The Board of
Adjustment noted this point. (R. 72-73).
Reply to Fact Paragraphs 16-19. Counsel's question to Mr. Lyman asked
whether "before the fence was upgraded [year 2000], at the most you had a few
animals, maybe six at most on that property?" Mr. Lyman answered, "Possibly."
(R. 85-86; emphasis added). Mr. Lyman was not confused by this question, which
made no distinction between cows or calves or horses or llamas. It was a question
about animals, period. When pressed by the City's attorney as to uhow many did
you have on there" up to April 1996, Mr. Lyman placed his best estimate at "half a
dozen, possibly." (R. 84; emphasis added). Mr. Lyman did not provide any other
estimate of the number of animals he had on the property up until April of 1996.
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His testimony cited by the City in paragraph 18 referred to "last winter" which
would have been the winter of 2007-2008, over ten years after the Zoning
Ordinance was enacted. (R. 84).
Reply to Fact Paragraphs 13, 20. Lyman testified that in 1997, very close to
the timeframe the Zoning Ordinance was passed, he had "taken his animals off
the property. (R. 79-80; emphasis added). During this time a Mr. Nelson used the
property to store some horses, and then for a year or a year and a half after Mr.
Nelson used the property the lot was vacant, with no animals. (R. 79-80). This is
consistent with the evidence in the letter submitted by the owner of the property,
Mr. Coombs. He stated that he allowed a Mr. Nelson to use the property "for a
place to keep his horses and as a camp spot, for a few years . . . ." (R. 60). Mr.
Haran and Mr. Lyman testified that a few cows were then placed on the property
around 1999 or 2000 in order to eat down the weeds. (R. 79-80, 101). Mr.
Coombs also stated: "After complaints from Mr. Haran [in 1999 or 2000], cattle
were placed in the lot to keep the weeds down, and alleviate the fire hazard." (R.
60; emphasis added). Overall, the City's recitation of facts does not support the
Board's finding that up to 18 animals plus their offspring were on the property in
the April 1996 timeframe.

Rather, the record testimony shows that from 1990

through 1999 or 2000 the property was sporadically used for a few animals, the
most being six or half a dozen, until after the fences were repaired in
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approximately 2000, when Mr. Haran, Mr. Mosier and Mr. Sorenson all testified to
a significant increase in the numbers of animals on the property, which is
supported by the photographic evidence.

(City's Fact Paragraphs 21-25;

photographs at R. 43-55). The fact that Mr. Haran did not recall seeing any
animals on the property in the mid to late 1990's is not inconsistent with the
overall testimony, given the limited and sporadic nature of the use of the property
during those years.
Reply to Fact Paragraph 23. Mr. Sorenson's testimony did not differ with
Mr. Haran's.

He recalled at most half a dozen animals (horses and llamas

combined) on the property in 1993 (R. 95), which was before Mr. Haran purchased
the property in 1994 and relocated to it in 1995 (R. 102-103). Mr. Sorenson's
testimony at record pages 94-95 was that he did not recall seeing Mr. Lyman's
cows on the property until after April 1996. Mr. Sorenson did not provide any
numbers of animals on the property during 1996 and testified that the numbers of
animals on the property increased and became a problem (noise, odor, dust, runoff)
after Faye Alvey died in 2000. (R. 93-94).
Reply to Fact Paragraph 28. The City admits that the Board of Adjustment
based its decision upon a finding that Mr. Lyman claimed he had twelve cows on
the property in the three years prior to the enactment of the zoning ordinance.
(City's Brief at 11.) Mr. Lyman's testimony was that from the mid to late 1980's
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he had 4[a]nywhere from one to a dozen" cows on the property. (R. 84). This
testimony was not specific to the timeframe leading up to April of 1996. As noted
above, when asked about the specific timeframe leading up to and including April
1996, Mr. Lyman testified twice that the most animals he could recall having on
the property back then was half a dozen. The fundamental error by the Board of
Adjustment was failing to focus on Mr. Lyman's testimony of the extent of use up
to April 1996, as opposed to Mr. Lyman's more general testimony covering the
entire time from the mid to late 1980's up to the time of the hearing.
II.

HARAN MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE.
Haran properly marshaled the evidence focusing on the relevant timeframe

of April 1996. Contrary to the City's argument (City's Brief at 12-14), Mr. Haran
did not omit any relevant evidentiary points. First, the City says Haran omitted
Mr. Lyman's testimony about the one to a dozen cows. Haran in fact cited and
discussed this evidence at page 10 of his opening brief. Haran correctly pointed
out the fact that Mr. Lyman, when pressed as to the timeframe leading up to April
of 1996, set the number at half a dozen. (Haran's Brief at 10-11.) Second, the City
cites to Mr. Sorenson's testimony about horses and llamas. This testimony was
discussed at page 5 of Haran's brief.

Third, the City points to Sorenson's

testimony about when he recalled first seeing cows on the property.

Haran cited

to and discussed Sorenson's testimony at pages 5-6 of his brief. Finally, the City
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points to a supposed admission by Haran that he did not keep count of the numbers
of animals before September 1996. Haran made no such admission

I le stated he

was not keeping written records over the entire time covered in the log he
submitted into evidence. (R. 98). However, he testified from his memory (as did
all the witnesses) about the use of the property, in his case starting when he bought
the property in 1994. (R. 100-103). Unlike the other witnesses, Mr. Haran started
keeping a written log, in 2004, to document the problems caused by the increasing
numbers of cows. (R. 98).
In short, Haran properly marshaled the evidence. He recited the testimony
of every witness, focusing on the relevant timeframe of April 1996. He attached
the entire record, which is relatively short, and cited to the photographic evidence.
All of this evidence, when examined witness by witness and as a whole, supports
one finding that could be reached by a reasonable person* limited, periodic use of
the property at issue for storing up to six animals between 1990 and April 1996.
111

I HL P I * CANNOT EXPLAIN AWAY THE RECORD EVIDENCE,
PARTICULARLY MR. LYMAN'S TESTIMONY.
The City argues why Mr. Lyman's testimony, setting his use of the property

at six animals up until 1996, should be ignored. The City first argues that for range
management purposes the government and local ranchers count a cow and calf as
one animal unit (City's Brief at 9, 15). The assumption applied to counting cows
for purposes of managing range areas on public lands cannot be used to overcome
4812-5931-9046 1
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the testimony of Mr. Lyman, and other witnesses, about the actual use of the
property at issue. The same is true with respect to the City's argument about cows
versus heifers. (City's Brief at 16).
The City then suggests Mr. Lyman was confused about dates. (City's Brief,
at 16.) Mr. Lyman was asked pointed questions about the use of the property up
until April of 1996. Mr. Lyman's simple responses to simple questions cannot be
discounted based upon alleged confusion.

Mr. Lyman was given ample

opportunity to answer the key question and twice reluctantly admitted, consistent
with the other witnesses, that the use of the property was limited to a few animals,
half a dozen at most, prior to April 1996.
The City also relies upon the testimony of Mr. Alvey. (City's Brief, at 15.)
However, as noted above, the Board correctly found Mr. Alvey's testimony, which
only covered up to 1990, had no evidentiary value on the issue of the use in April
1996.
The City tries to argue Mr. Sorenson's and Mr. Mosier's testimony
somehow was inconsistent with Mr. Haran's. Even if this were true, which as
shown above it is not, their overall testimony clearly supports one reasonable
finding: limited use of the property at issue for storing at most six animals prior to
April of 1996.

The City also makes a confusing point about the animals

supposedly being able to wander between Mr. Lyman's property and Mr. Coomb's
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property and then tries to link this to Mr. Mosier's testimony. City's Brief at 17, n.
5. The relevant fact is thai Mi. Mosier did not recall seeing any cows on the
property at issue (Mr. Coomb's) until after 2000, when he noticed a herd of cows
on the property.
In sum, given the overall evidence, in particular the testimony of Mr.
Lyman, the only reasonable finding a person could make was of limited, periodic
use for storing up to six animals between 1990 and April 1996. The Board's
arbitrary decision to combine horse and cow numbers to allow eighteen aci I
animals, then throw in their offspring, was contrary to the substantial evidence of
the actual use and must be overturned on that basis.
IV.

THE CITY SEEKS TO READ THE PROHIBITION IN THE
RESIDENTIAL ZONE AGAINST COMMERCIAL CATTLE
OPERATIONS OUT OF THE ORDINANCE.
As a fallback position, the City advances a tortured reading of the allowed

uses under the residential zoning ordinance. It argues the allowance of a corral on
residential properties to store animals, Chapter 18-2(4) of the Zoning Ordinance,
somehow opens the door to unlimited commercial livestock use on a residential lot.
The City's argument violates the rule of statutory construction which provides that
a court must avoid interpretations which render portions of a statute inoperative
and the rule that the more specific of two provisions governs over the more
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general. See Hall v. Utah State Department of Corrections, 24 P.3d 958, 963 (Utah
2001).
Chapter 18-2(1), subpart b, of the Zoning Ordinance, which specifically
applies to the keeping of animals on residential lots, provides that they can be kept
for "recreation or for family food production for the primary use of persons
residing on the premises."

No one resides on the vacant lot owned by Mr.

Coombs, so no animals can be kept there. The use of the vacant lot by Mr. Lyman
to store his animals, especially for his commercial cattle operation, is a
nonconforming use. Any other reading would eviscerate Chapter 18-2(1), subpart
b, along with the protections against undue impacts on adjoining property owners
provided in the RR-1-20 residential zone applicable in this case, the most
restrictive zone within the Zoning Ordinance.
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the Board of Adjustment decision as being against
the substantial evidence.

The Court should order that the pre-existing

nonconforming use was limited to six total animals, be they horses, cows, or
llamas, adults or offspring.

The Zoning Ordinance requires this finding based

upon the record evidence and based upon its strict limitation on any expansion of
nonconforming uses. The nonconforming use provisions of the Zoning Ordinance
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are meant to protect residential property owners, like Mr. Haran, from the
expansion of use that is interfering with his enjoyment of his property.
DATED this 4th day of June, 2010.

MICHAEL A. ZOE>y/
PARSONS BEHLESi LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants
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